So far, the diplomatic barometer indicates that Kenya has a narrow lead ahead of Djibouti in its bid to represent Eastern Africa as non-permanent member of the UNSC over the 2021-2022 period.

In the Kenya –Djibouti contest, three outcomes are imminent. One, Kenya will sail through after various rounds of voting. Two, Kenya and Djibouti could share the seat following a split outcome where each gets one year of the two-year period. Three, Kenya loses to Djibouti. 

This is an unlikely but not surprising outcome.

Kenya’s strength is based on the fact that it has been formally endorsed by African Union. In fact, on 9th June 2020, few days to the 17th June vote, the AU reiterated its endorsement of Kenya as its nominee for a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council for the term 2021-2022. 

The continental argument is that for the protection of AU influence and legitimacy in future international affairs, the intransigence of Djibouti which insists on bypassing the position of African body should be corrected by voting for Kenya. 

Only by doing so is the African Union able to sustain its tradition of approaching top UN positions and matters with one voice.

Another selling point for Kenya is its visibility globally compared to Djibouti. 

This considers Kenya’s recent hosting and leadership of the 79 membership organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS), its strategic position as a gateway to EAC promising economy, prominence through cultural diplomacy such as athletics and a history of contributing to global peace and security through UN and AU peace missions and regional mediation efforts.

Further, in terms of diplomatic fairness anchored on international relations principles of rotational and negotiated agreements, it is Kenya’s time to serve given that is 22 years since Kenya served on the UNSC (last 1997-98), while Djibouti last served in 1994. 

Persuasively, diplomatic tradition should disallow representation of Africa at the UN Security Council by three countries that are Islamic and French-speaking. Given that currently, Niger and Tunisia are at the UNSC representing West Africa and North Africa, respectively.

However, Kenya faces internal, regional and international challenges in its UNSC bid. Internally the recent political developments can potentially injure some of Kenya’s 10-point pledge for Africa at the UNSC for instance the point on “Justice, human rights and democracy; promotion of a useful environment for a just society.” 

For instance, the public accusations of the President by the Chief Justice have created a perception of the executive clawing back on democracy, rule of law and constitutionalism. 

Notably is the perception that the executive is infringing on the principle of separation of powers between executive, judiciary and legislature. Internal issues such as publicized cases of police brutality and night arrest of human rights defenders also threaten Kenya’s international image. 

Regionally Kenya has had strained relations with both Tanzania and Uganda especially during this COVID19 pandemic. 

This is in addition to its border conflict with Somalia. Kenya is also perceived as transactional and ‘greedy’ in its diplomacy; it has been a candidate for several positions ranging from AU Commission chairmanship, hosting of African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA) to hosting UN Global Service Center. 

These portray Kenya as self-seeking, and it is made worse by case of Kenya’s bilateral trade agreements with USA despite AfCFTA ambitions.

Yet internationally, the conundrum of the two countries’ candidature to the UN Security Council lies in the fact that both states provide attractive opportunities to the global powers especially the UNSC permanent members. 

Both Kenya and Djibouti are strategically located on the Indian Ocean providing opportunities for global powers to establish trade, military bases and influence geo-politics. Indeed, both countries are allies to the global powers. 

Kenya provides an avenue for major powers to pursue trade interests and influence geo-politics in the Greater Horn of Africa region and the continent at large.    

Djibouti’s strategic location within the Red Sea Alliance region – a significantly emerging forum for Asia and Western powers- has attracted diplomatic relations with various states. 

Notably, Djibouti has become home to several military bases for powers such as USA, France, Japan, Italy and China. Perhaps this is a pointer to prediction from some quarters that Kenya and Djibouti could possibly share the seat.      

While Kenya appears to present a technocratic argument: climate change, gender equality, youth empowerment, bridging gap, human rights, peace and security. 

Djibouti presents political arguments that focus on Kenya’s conduct such as territorial conflicts with Somalia, unreliability as an international partner and violation of the spirit of sovereign equality of states and the practice of rotation of seats since Djibouti argues that it was the first to declare its candidacy in 2016.

If Kenya clinches the UNSC non-permanent member position, it is a chance of holding the rotational presidency, a position that opens extensive avenues for influence on matters that affect Kenya’s national interests and Africa. 

Kenya can get great power support and concessions whenever the five permanent members require backing of at least four non-permanent members to initiate veto Council decisions. 

The country could also leverage on its position in the UNSC to get a favorable outcome in its territorial conflict with Somalia currently before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)  

The COVID-19 pandemic has presented Kenya and Africa, with an overlap of health, economic, social, and political disruptions, which have in turn become the common product of global interactions. Consequently, this has placed a rapidly escalating demand for a new construct for foreign policy, which includes, regional and intra-African cooperation.

Forecasts indicate that health security has now become and will continue to feature as the primary driver in all diplomatic dialogues across the board, including within commercial diplomacy discourse.

Africa’s fight against the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, will have to sustain the participation of multi-sector and multi-lateral stakeholders, with the objective of actualizing measurable gains plus learning points, during what is now presumed to be a ‘health marathon’ towards the vaccine or other related interventions.

From a diplomacy context, it can be argued that health diplomacy has rapidly become a fundamental, cross-cutting diplomatic decision-making catalyst in Africa and the globe. The recent evidence of this is the announcement of the postponement in the commencement of the African Economic block, by the Secretary-General of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Mr. Wamkele Mene.

The secretary-general cited that this decision was influenced largely by a clear change in the momentary trajectory by the member states, from economic or trade development to National plus Continental Health Security. In addition to this, the second Intra-African Trade Fair (IATF2020) which was scheduled to take place from 1st to 7th September 2020 in Kigali, Rwanda, has also been postponed for one year, due to the COVID-19 Pandemic.

The trade and commerce spheres have presented the most quantifiable adverse implications of the COVID-19 pandemic. As governments interrogate the potential mechanisms to put in place in order to re-open the economies, stimulating international cross border trade will need to feature as a catalyst of the reopening strategies.

How then will health, safety and commerce interplay in order to help governments to sustain the slow, yet upward trajectory in trade and commerce? What are the emerging foreign policies that can be expected, as a result of the marriage between public health safety and commerce?

Once implemented, The AfCFTA is estimated to be the fertile ground to the world’s largest single market. The World Economic Forum (WEF) estimated that the Pan-African market will generate about 4 trillion dollars from investment and intra-African trade.

AfCFTA is being lauded as the African catalyst to leveraging competitiveness of industries and enterprises in member states, enlarging the opportunities for economies of scale improvements, plus enhancing the capabilities of national or continental resource allocations.

African commercial diplomacy practitioners are already poised to act as the negotiators alongside the Foreign Trade Policy attaches when the pan-African market is commenced, and they will place an active focus on the development of commercial cooperation between the business communities of the member states.

Their aim will be to embed sustainable commercial gains for their own countries, in the form of inward and outward trade and investment, through the means of intra-African business promotion as well as, improved commercial facilitation activities.

Africa’s trade has for a very long time been plagued by non- tariff barriers, soft periodic protectionism, as well as by the ‘hue and cry’ from the private investors, regarding the very slow elimination of these non-tariff barriers. COVID 19 pandemic has significantly added to the existing non-tariff barriers and is already spurring some form of protectionism from some of the member states.

An example of these is the added COVID 19 related health safety constraints to cross-border trade, being experienced by logistics companies in East Africa, with regards to the limitation of the movement of their Truck Drivers.

It is expected that, in the coming days, these and other emerging cross-border trade – COVID 19 related Health Safety regulations, are bound to be developed further into African Foreign Trade Policy instruments.

In anticipation of these, therefore, it is paramount for commercial diplomacy practitioners to collaborate with health diplomacy practitioners, so as to begin to develop a sustainable and proactive framework which will be able to assess, interrogate and prospect on the current impact of public health safety non-tariff barriers on commercial activities.

Additionally, it is anticipated that there will be a remodeling of new trade cooperation mechanisms between AfCFTA member states, in relation to the overall long-term influence of these public health safety non-tariff barriers on the African Trade Policy architecture. This will be an extremely crucial variable in the economic state craft of member states.

Global forecasts indicate overall business investor confidence has fallen sharply due to the overlapping adverse implications stemming from the COVID 19 Pandemic. Classical international business valuations will be predominately shaped by actual and perceived public health interventions within the country where the business is domiciled, combined by pandemic risk mitigation instruments hosted within each business.

It is inevitable, therefore, that in an effort to establish a semblance of long term investor security, international business investor negotiations will be more inclined to apportion pseudo-sanctions on business entities, based on the economic valuation of national public health policies set as governors of the private sector.

In view of this, it will be necessary for public health safety negotiators, to posture as arbitrators between investors and business owners, to preempt and resolve negotiation bottlenecks, as well as secure “win-win’s” for the proposed business alliances.

Movement of persons, pandemic resilient trade policy agreements, equitable appraisals of business potential, among others, will be retained as some of the continent’s Foreign Policy fundamentals.

As Africa continues to interrogate this evolution of foreign policy, the continent will need to expeditiously and adequately train health diplomacy practitioners, in an effort to build the continent’s capacity to understand, remodel and successfully negotiate the myriad of health safety-related foreign policy eventualities.

The continent will also have to design a leak-proof human resource pipeline, in order to retain the health diplomats who will not only have the academic competencies but will also have the added tacit knowledge of African nuances that are crucial bridging tools during African commercial negotiations and foreign policy considerations.

Kenya has an exemplary and enviable record at the multilateral context and at the regional level. It has established meaningful relations and partnerships with countries that are part of major intergovernmental negotiations including the P5 (Permanent Members of Security Council- China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States), the A3 (African Non-Permanent Security Council Members, currently Niger, South Africa and Tunisia), G77 & China, the African Group, Asia-Pacific States, Eastern European States, Western European and others States (WEOG), Latin American and Caribbean States, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the Pacific and Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) and the BRICS – (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

Kenya aspires for a United Nations (UN) rooted at the centre of a rules based international system. A UN where all states exercise all rights due to them equally as enshrined in the Charter of the global body. Kenya will work with the entire UN membership in executing the mandate of the UNSC in an inclusive, responsive and consultative manner irrespective of size and military might. Since admission to the UN, Kenya’s commitment to the principles and ideals of the UN has been resolute and consistent, particularly on matters of peace and security, sustainable development, global environmental and climate change issues. Kenya believes strongly that sustainable development, which is humanity’s aspiration, can only be achieved when there is peace and security for all. Similarly, peace and security will be at risk in any situation where development is not inclusive, gender balanced and sustainable.

Located along the coast of the Indian Ocean, making it the Eastern gateway to Africa, Kenya has strong links with East Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, Southern African regions of the continent and across the Indian ocean with India and other Asian countries. Owing to the fragility of her locale, Kenya has been relentless in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, and the world at large. Our anchor role in pursuit for peace particularly in the Horn of Africa has led to a strong and evolving peace-making doctrine within and beyond our borders.

Kenya is an open democratic country that is an expression of the spirit and the letter of the Kenya Constitution promulgated in 2010. Kenya’s free market economy continues to be the anchor and bedrock of Kenya’s economic development, stability and growth.

Kenya’s promise is to bring its wealth of experience in preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and post conflict reconstruction to the UNSC. This orientation frames our campaign for the UNSC seat: Peace and Security for Sustainable Development.

Kenya is the African Union endorsed Candidate for the non-permanent seat of the United Nations Security Council for the term 2021-2022. We seek your vote at the elections to be held on 17 June 2020.

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As the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic continues to be felt globally, the growing anxiety due to an uncertain future is putting pressure on many states as the level of threat varies from one country to another.
That can be attributed to deliberate or unintentional factors that may increase or reduce the level of state vulnerability.
Questions are being raised as to whether aggressive government policy on social distancing an over-reaction, or if the measures taken by any government and the international community are adequate.
Such queries are emerging due to the negative economic repercussions that are unexpectedly developing as a result of adopting and implementing social distancing measures.
In an unprecedented turn of events, the international community is facing the most significant global health challenge, that is dependent on getting national policies plus citizen participation right for the sake state stability and individual survival.
This pandemic, like any other public health concern, begins and stops at the individual and society levels. It is now glaring that the, elimination of poverty and inequality help to create resilience needed in such situations.
Citizens, therefore, now have a growing responsibility in what is predominantly the preserve of the state in acting against a significant national security threat.
In order to play this role effectively, there must also be an empowerment mechanism from the state. This has proved to be a challenge for developing countries who’s economic and health sectors were already strained before the onset of the pandemic.
Ease of transmission of the disease has also placed the individual at the core of the security debate in the international system for in the current COVID-19 pandemic, state action or inaction is breeding discontent as a result of unfulfilled expectations in service delivery.
Although social distancing measures are successful in preventing domestic health crises, other supportive measures such as curfews or ultimately lockdowns are being frowned upon as a result of economic shocks faced by the majority poor.
This however does not establish the necessary security measures against the emergence of a second wave of infections.
Meanwhile, initiatives in achieving about ‘herd immunity’ have been applied in countries such as Sweden or closer home in Tanzania. Herd immunity is attained when most of the population becomes infected and acquires immunity.
Alternatively, social distancing is used as means to allow gradual exposure in order to achieve herd immunity without effecting lockdowns or curfews.
This is in order to develop a system in which the healthcare system is not overwhelmed. This way, the long-term effect of herd immunity will provide some sort of insulation from future outbreaks by creating a critical mass of immune citizens.
As is the case in every situation, there is no one size that fits all, and the impact of COVID-19 is yet to be clearly felt and understood. Increased poverty and high levels of vulnerable groups point towards a significant level of risk in terms of fatalities.
This has drawn global attention to the possible impact of COVID-19 on developing countries. In all this, the operational environment and risk factors are diverse.
The main lesson so far is that public trust is a crucial ingredient in the successful implementation of social distancing policies aimed at containing COVID-19. Success can be attributed to positive steps taken by government including the settlement of medical expenses.
This is because individual responsibility has been shown to be high in countries that have confidence in their government due to the open approach in terms of communication and sensitization.
Public confidence also makes the citizens more resilient to the aftershocks of containment policies and increase adaptability to the new normal if governments clarify the next steps or adaptation measures for individuals to plan their future in times of difficulty.
Secondly, behavioral norms are being re-established in all aspects of human interaction, having both challenges and opportunities to found more adaptable societies.
Lastly, despite existing policies in place, high numbers of infections have adverse effects on the economy and healthcare system due to potential to completely overwhelm existing capacity and resources.
This means the success of lockdowns is ultimately dependent on the economic resilience of the state and demographics as most countries with higher casualties have higher aging populations.
Despite the uncertainty, many are waiting for things to go back to what they were, but it seems unlikely in the short term with various interactions such as work shifting to the digital space.
In understanding the ‘new normal,’ it is useful to map out the emergence and level of threats posed by COVID-19 domestically, regionally, and internationally.
Countries that adopt aggressive measures aimed at enforcing the implementation of social distancing, risk eroding public trust in the measures needed to curb the spread of the disease thereby leading to apathy.

This increases chances of a second outbreak because it may create a wedge between the government and the citizens, whose cooperative efforts are key in determining the level of success in policies aimed at containing COVID-19.

The willingness of the population to follow the government directives enhances the ability of the state to enforce stringent measures to attain effectiveness.

Nonetheless, not all governments have taken that stance. Some countries have opted for herd immunity by maintaining a business as usual stance.

Overall, the ideal situation would be to achieve immunity in the long run without threatening state stability. Maintaining public confidence is a key factor that will dominate the conversation on how to tackle pandemics for developing countries in the COVID and Post COVID-19 era.

This is a result of global and domestic inequalities as well as high levels of poverty, unemployment, and human insecurity in developing countries.

When you hold up the bright and blind spots with regards to Kenyans living abroad, you are likely to see more of the latter than the former.
Yet, there is an unambiguous, state-instituted diaspora policy framework. This would ideally dovetail with the keenness of patriotic Kenyans abroad interested in making a positive change in their motherland.
The problem is that the various interests involved in matters are, woefully, on divergent paths.
If state-led intentions coalesced with the interests of Kenyans abroad, the bright side of things would shine a light on the current pessimism converting the mutual contentions into pragmatic action plans.
We could move the needle away from missed opportunities, towards the harnessing of the widely acknowledged diaspora potential.
Going back to the drawing board is the way forward. We are called upon to re-think and re-engineer of the whole gamut of Kenyan diaspora affairs.
The challenge is that state officials charged with the responsibility of executing diaspora programs are inclined to take defensive stances. Enumeration of the challenges hampering the full exploitation of the Kenyan diaspora is often seen as an indictment!
On the other hand, Kenyans living abroad take critical stances and pessimistic attitudes conditioned by years of pent-up frustrations over unmet expectations. The diaspora community almost always put the blame for the challenges they encounter at the doorsteps of government.
The resultant chasm between these two polarities is what government officials and Kenyans abroad should seek to bridge. In the South African political parlance, government and diaspora need to “find each other”.
There is no shortage of literature on the lacuna between intentions on the one hand and constraints on the other. For instance, the diaspora largely view politically appointed ambassadors are ill-fitted to execute diaspora-supportive initiatives.
This perspective holds that diplomatic missions are as politically corrupt and morally bankrupt as the political system back home.
From the government end, the view may be that Kenyans abroad are a conceited, unrealistic and insatiable lot. That a large segment of the group specializes in whining from privileged locales away from home.
Government officials bristle at the ostensible “special” treatment that diaspora demand without regard for the dire situation their brethren back at home endure. The view from the government may be that there are many national priorities that trump the frivolous diaspora demands.
The consequence is an unremitting stalemate! Filling the gaps between the real and perceived shortcomings on either side of the divide with an eye on the latent diaspora potential requires candour on both sides.
As the adage goes, the first step in resolving a contentious problem is to figure out where “the rain started beating us”.
Propitiously, Kenya has a diaspora framework outlined in its foreign policy generally and in the diaspora policy specifically.
A structured starting point would be to review the letter and spirit of these ideally sacrosanct documents as a means of bridging the gap between aspirations and realities.

As rule of thumb, policymaking, when followed through, provides a structured framework for reaching rapprochement over knotty issues. The key question for the review process would be: have the specific standpoints, principles and action plans lived up to expectation?

Both the current Kenyan foreign and the diaspora policies were promulgated in 2014 building on the momentum begun in the crafting of the Vision 2030. Diaspora was, and ideally remains, a flagship program within the bullish national plan.

The policies were celebrated by stakeholders as the country had never promulgated written foreign and diaspora policies.

That diaspora organisations and supra-national organisations were involved goes to demonstrate the wide purchase, acceptance and sense of ownership that the policy garnered. For instance, the World Bank contributed US$500,000 for the development of the strategy.

The arrival of these polices tell us that the framers of Kenya’s international affairs were fully seized of the centrality diaspora.

Nearly seven years later, these policies require a thorough review. At a fundamental level, there has been a sea change in global, regional and domestic affairs so much so that these policies need to be re-engineered.

As an example, governments no longer have a monopoly in the diplomatic space as non-state actors such as diaspora formations increasingly play a large role.

The failures of state-led diaspora management are legion: the diaspora directorate has been financially constrained; the diaspora portal launched by Deputy President William Ruto in late 2014 never took off; the National Diaspora Council of Kenya – formed as part of the new policy – has punched way below its envisaged role; the stakeholder-partnership spirit has fizzled out.

The objectives of these policies aimed to “promote and protect the interests of Kenyans abroad and, “enhance partnership with the Kenya Diaspora and descendants”. If you ask most of the Kenyan diaspora, they feel neither protected nor see Kenya Inc. as a partner.

In other words, the policies have only had an underwhelming impact.

Diaspora diplomacy is one of the foreign pillars along with peace, economic, environmental and cultural diplomacies. The goals of the policy are to among other things; tap the untapped potential of Kenyans abroad as means of integrating the diaspora into the development agenda.

However, enfeebled consular services, poor leveraging of Kenyans abroad and weak policies on remittances fly in the face of these otherwise well-meaning strategies.

Most Kenyans living abroad do not see their government as welcoming to their potential involvement in the countries developmental plans. In fact, many feel rebuffed, alienated and, “on their own”.

The upshot is that there is a huge lacuna between the diaspora diplomacy pillar and the other pillars of peace, economics, environment and culture.

The failure of the policy can be seen in the fact that basic data on the Kenyan diaspora remains a grey area. How does one even strategize when you are in the dark on metrics?

Estimates however, indicate that there were about 3 million Kenyans living abroad in 2014, a figure that must have shot up towards or over 4 million people. This nearly 10 per cent of the population, a huge demographic asset, nay, human capital!

Government officials may enumerate a retinue of challenges to explain away the factors that hamper implementation of the diaspora policies. The key challenge would be financial constraints.

However, discussions with diaspora organizations could help provide innovative and cost-effective alternatives. For instance, diaspora organizations can be co-opted into working closely with diplomatic missions for instance in data collection.

Digital platforms can be leveraged a little more in the version of virtual embassies. Diaspora can serve as honorary consuls in countries where Kenya doesn’t have permanent missions.

The diaspora mechanisms need an overhaul, a thorough review based on reflecting what went wrong with the aspirational policies of 2014. The next step is for state, supra-national and diaspora stakeholders and diaspora to “find each other” around a consultative table.

There is an avalanche of information out there. The review would do well to consider and domesticate best practice countries as well as guidelines developed by a host of organisations.